Vagueness and Legal Language by Christie, George C.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1964
Vagueness and Legal Language
George C. Christie
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christie, George C., "Vagueness and Legal Language" (1964). Minnesota Law Review. 1369.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1369
Vagueness and Legal Language
Vagueness is an inescapable attribute of language. Pro-
fessor Christie's interesting and informative analysis
discusses how vagueness is often an aid to precise com-
munication and how a functioning legal system, depends
on the existence of vagueness in language. Professor
Christie then discusses the limitations imposed on the
use of language as a means of communication by the
presence of this very same vagueness and suggests that
these limitations rather than being cause for despair
should spur the -utilization in the law of other communi-
cation devices. He concludes that vagueness is not a
deterrent but, rather, an indispensable element in the
regulation of human conduct through legal rules.
George C. Christie*
How often has the complaint been heard that words, the tools
of the lawyer, are vague and imprecise. This Article will examine
the underlying basis of this complaint, and it will be urged that
it is precisely this vagueness in language which often permits the
law to perform so many of its social functions. It is not being
urged that vagueness is itself an end or always a boon to the
lawyer's work, but it is submitted that such an examination is
an essential prolegomenon for any further study of the effect of
language upon the judicial process.
In the first few pages of this Article attention will be directed
to the more obvious ways in which the vagueness of language
affects the law. Succeeding portions will focus on the less con-
spicuous relationships of vagueness to the law. Finally, a discus-
sion of the limitations imposed on certain areas of the law by
vagueness and imprecision in language will emphasize the need
for other techniques whose use, when noticed, is often decried
but which should, instead, be welcomed as an important addition
to the legal tool chest. If this last point can be established, the
implications that it has for the judicial process as a whole will
be well worth considering, although the pursuit of this more am-
bitious undertaking is beyond the scope of the present Article.
At the outset the customary distinctions between vagueness
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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and ambiguity must be kept in mind. Vagueness is normally used
in the philosophy of language in connection with general terms
with an open textured meaning. When such words are used in
discourse, the intended scope of the term is often unclear. Terms
referring to colors are simple examples of vague terms. Ambi-
guity on the other hand is normally used to refer to a situation
where a general term may be at once clearly true of certain ob-
jects and at the same time clearly false of the same objects. A
classic example given by Professor Quine is the term "light" as
applied to the term "feathers," since "light feathers" may be in
fact dark in color although light in weight.' To give another ex-
ample, Professor I. L. A. Hart refers to a case where a testator
leaves his "vessels" to a legatee. Did the testator mean to refer
to his crockery or to his yachts or to both?2 With these distinc-
tions in mind, it should be noted that this Article will be primarily
concerned with the problem of vagueness.
I.
In this first section, dealing with the more generally recog-
nized interrelationships between law and the vagueness of lan-
guage, particular attention will be directed to two legal tech-
niques dependent for their effect precisely upon the vagueness
in language. These techniques are by no means confined to the
legal sphere; their use is much more widespread and no philoso-
phy of language can afford to ignore their existence. The first
technique is the purposive search for vagueness, for reasons some-
times bad and sometimes good. The second technique is the pur-
posive use of vagueness as a means of permitting at least some
amount of necessary control over the authority that one power
group is forced to delegate to a subordinate power group.
A. TE PuRPosivE SEARCH FOR VAGUENESS
No one doubts that it is the function of courts to interpret
statutes in the light of the purposes which the legislature had
in mind in enacting the statutes. This is no more than a specific
application of the principle, self-evident to all students of lan-
guage, that a speaker's remarks must be interpreted in the con-
text in which the remarks are made. But sometimes those who
are called upon to interpret someone's remarks disapprove of the
1. QuINE, WORD AND OBJECT 129 (1960).
2. Hart, Dias and Hughes on Jurisprudence, 4 J. Soc'Y Pun. TEACHERS
OF LAW 143, 144 (1958); cf. Williams, Language and the Law-If, 61 L.Q.
REv. 179-81, 189-92 (1945). The latter article is one of five very interesting
and lucid articles by Dr. Williams entitled "Language and the Law" which
appeared in volumes 61 and 62 of the Law Quarterly Review.
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purpose which the speaker seemingly had in mind. The situation
becomes acute when the interpreter is required to act upon the
speaker's remarks. In such circumstances it is only natural for
the addressee of the remarks to search for vagueness so as to be
able to say, "well he really couldn't have meant this, so he must
have meant this."13 The listener thus discards a contextually more
likely interpretation for a less plausible one which better accords
with his standards of good and bad.
Normative language is constantly undergoing such stresses in
the ordinary experience of almost everyone. How many house-
wives have had to tell their maids that "dust the house" meant
just that -and not merely "dust the porcelain"? In the law, the
enterprise of purposely pretending not to hear is, of course, insti-
tutionalized. One may wonder what Anthony Comstock's reac-
tion would have been if someone had told him that the statutes
unqualifiedly prohibiting the importation of contraceptive de-
vices into the United States,4 which he was so instrumental in
getting enacted,s were going to be construed so as only to pro-
hibit the importation of such devices for "immoral purposes."
Mr. Comstock would have been no doubt gratified to know that
the importation of contraceptives by physicians is not for "im-
moral purposes." 6
It is ancient history that the exploitation of -the vagueness in
language reaches maximum utilization when the groups in con-
3..Cf. the following AP dispatch which appeared in the Minneapolis Sun-
day Tribune:
A 'Windsor man who posted a sign on his barn saying 'Tiease do
not ask permission to hunt," returned from work in nearby Bingham-
ton to find several hunters in his woods.
When -he inquired whether they had read -his prominently displayed
sign, one replied, "We did read it. We -thought you just didn't want to
be bothered."
Mlnfneapolis Sunday Tribune, March 8, 1964, § H, Ip. 3, col. 1.
4. 46 Stat. 688 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1958). A com-
panion criminal statute also makes it a crime to transmit contraceptives
through the nuails. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 .(1958). The first such prohibitions, in
substantially the same absolute form, were contained in the Act of March 3,
1873. 17 Stat. 598.
5. Mr. Comstock was influential in securing the passage of the legislation
of 1873, including the provisions prohibiting the transmission of contraceptives.
See BENNErT, Asuno.xr CoMsrocK 1014-17, 1067-73 (1878); Bnovrx & Lnc-,
A.THoNT COMSTocK 131-44 (1927).
6. United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) (construing
46 Stat. 688 (1930) (now 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1958))). The court relied upon
a suggestion in an earlier case involving the criminal statute. Youngs Rubber
Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 Fad 103 (2d Cir. 1930) (the intent to make an
absolute prohibition cannot -be 'lightly ... ascribed to Congress").
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trol of the legislatures and those in control of the courts are
antagonistic to each other.7 At such times maxims such as "stat-
utes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed"
are applied with a vengeance to make legislative change of the
law difficult." Perhaps a desire that human liberty should not
be lightly taken away has led to the maxim that "penal statutes
should be strictly construed," and yet the application of this
maxim has certainly led to what some might call fairly gross
perversions of language.9 In the extreme case where a prohibition
against "every" is interpreted so as to prohibit only "some," it
may be felt that the distortion of language is so glaring that
there is no danger of the creation of new vagueness. Still, how
does a legislature make sure that "every" is taken to mean
"every"? At all events, enough has been said to indicate that,
owing to the conflicting human inclinations of not wanting to
disobey lawful directives and yet at the same time of not wanting
to implement directives considered unjust or unreasonable, lan-
7. There are other ways, of course, in which the courts may deal with legis-
lation of which they disapprove. Such legislation, for example, may be declared
void on account of vagueness. But not all extremely vague legislation is de-
clared void and the conclusion is inescapable that the void-for-vagueness
technique is often a way of deciding a case without articulating basic differ-
ences in policy between courts and legislatures. For a good discussion of this
question, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Ray. 67 (1960).
8. For an interesting and concise account of English and Canadian experi-
ence with the social legislation of the 1930's, see Willis, Statute Interpreta-
tion in a Nutshell, 16 CAN. B. REv. 1, 20-27 (1938). See generally Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 H.lAv. L. Rav. 383 (1908). In the famous
case of Johnson v. Southern Fac. Co., 117 Fed. 462 (8th Cir. 1902) a statute
requiring that "any car used in moving interstate traffic" be equipped with
automatic couplers was held not to apply to locomotives. The decision was
reversed. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904).
9. For illustrations, see Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 48 HARv. L. RFv. 748 (1935); Comment, Criminal Law and Procedure-
Statutory Construction, 32 MIcn. L. Rav. 976 (1934). Among the most shock-
ing examples is Lyons & Co. v. Keating, [1931] 2 K.B. 535, an English case,
where a statute prohibiting the use of any substance "purporting to be cream"
was held not to cover the use of emulsified fat in items purporting not to be
cream but only to contain cream. See also MoBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25 (1931): An airplane was held not within the scope of an act making
it illegal to transport a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce, where
motor vehicle was defined as an "automobile, automobile truck, automobile
wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for run-
ning on rails." In State v. Goldenberg, 30 Del. 458, 108 Atl. 137 (1910), a
pawnbroker who charged 3% interest per month and 3% of the amount of
the loan as storage fee for the property pawned was held not to violate a
statute restricting interest on loans to 3% per month.
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guage will often be the scapegoat. Where there appears to be
no vagueness, vagueness and even ambiguity 0 will be created;
the slightest trace of vagueness will be exploited. Once vagueness
has been found, one is free to choose the interpretation of which
one approves. There are, then, powerful forces at work impelling
men to search for vagueness in language and even intentionally
to create new vagueness with which a philosophy of language
must always reckon.
Yet no one would argue that such a technique - despite its
dependence on the exploitation or even the intentional creation
of vagueness -is a completely unjustified one. To deplore the
inevitable use of such a technique would be to ignore the fact
that legislatures and prior judges do make mistakes, do fail to
consider all the implications of their acts, do improvidently try
to accomplish too much and that some means must exist whereby
those called upon to administer existing norms to new cases can
avoid the disastrous results to which such improvidence would
otherwise lead. This is not to say that subsequent administrators
should, or even in the nature of things must, have unbridled dis-
cretion to avoid the implications of prior rules of law through
the purposive search for vagueness. For present purposes, it is
enough to note not only the inevitability but the necessity of such
a technique. The ascertainment of how best to keep this tech-
nique within reasonable bounds is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, although much of the succeeding portions of this Article will
be very relevant to such an inquiry.
B. Tna PURPosIvE USE OF VAGUENESS
Vagueness has some uses in law which permit men, through
the use of language, to achieve more sophisticated methods of
social control, for example, the use of vague language in legal
directives to-postpone ultimate decision. Such postponement may
be desired for a variety of reasons that are often interconnected.
It may be felt, for instance, that what is needed is individualized
application of a legal directive. Thus, in ordering integration of
the public schools, the Supreme Court said that integration must
proceed "with all deliberate speed."' The initial decision as to
what is "all deliberate speed" in any particular situation is left
for the lower federal courts after an examination of the circum-
stances of each case. On the other hand, vague language may
10. A man who tried to vote for a dead man was held not to have imper-
sonated one entitled to vote since dead men can't vote. Whiteley v. Chappell,
[1868] 4 QR. 147; cf. text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
1964], . 889
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also be used because a law giver may have a general idea of what
he wants to 'accomplish but may be uncertain as to what specific
conduct to prohibit. He decides on some vague general standard
which can evolve through a series of individual applications, a
general standard which can even change in content as the nature
of society changes. Perhaps the most famous of such general
standards are the "due process" provisions in the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution. 2 Another is the consti-
tutional grant of power to the federal government "to regulate
Commerce ...among the several states";13 it was once argued,
unsuccessfully, that Congress could not regulate interstate tele-
graph companies because at the time the Constitution was adopted
the telegraph had not yet been invented. 4 Finally, on a more
mundane level, one might cite section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, which empowers the FTC to prevent
"unfair methods of competition.""'
The importance of the flexibility that vagueness gives to all nor-
mative methods of social control can scarcely be overestimated and
is recognized by all. It allows man to exercise general control over
his social development without committing himself in advance
to any specific concrete course of action. Without such flexibility,
man would have to choose between no regulation and the impos-
sible task of minute specification of what is and what is not to
be permitted. Moreover, as already shown above, if man tries
to regulate too much in advance, he will be faced with the need
to pervert his own language through the constant creation of
vagueness in order to save himself from his own improvidence."0
II.
The two aspects of vagueness in language to be discussed in
this section, although very germane to 'the law, have received
12. It is obvious that "due process of law" and "the equal protection of
the laws" evolve in meaning with the development of man. Compare Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). At one time, of course, minimum wage regulation was unconstitu-
tional. Compare Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), with West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379.(1937).
13. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
14. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
15. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
16. There is an additional aspect of vagueness that is related to those
which have been discussed in the text. That is to say, there is another use of
vagueness that would have to be considered in any attempt to establish how
a legislature may assert its control over what is done by courts. It has been
noted that courts may search for and even create vagueness in order to avoid
legislative directives. It has also 'been noted that a legislature may use vague-
[Vol. 48:885
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attention primarily from philosophers of language and not from
lawyers. These two aspects of vagueness serve as positive boons
to language, particularly to legal language. The first is the need
for vagueness necessitated by what Professor Quine calls "the
linearity of discourse."1 7 The second aspect also helps in coping
with deficiencies inherent in language; it is a means of attaining
a precision in discourse which would otherwise be either unat-
tainable or attainable only at a price which we might hesitate to
pay. This use of the vagueness in language may best be intro-
duced by an example from I. A. Richards. Professor Richards
points out that a painter working with oils may, with a limited
palette, attain more precise representations by thinning and com-
bining his few initial colors than can a man constructing a mosaic
who starts out with a greater variety of colored tiles but who,
precisely because he cannot thin and combine his tiles, is more
limited than the painter in the results he can obtain.18 The gen-
eral idea is, of course, that through the skillful combination of
vague terms a draftsman can often achieve better results than he
can by stringing together - or, if one prefers, fitting together -
precise technical terms.
A. VAGUENESS AwD THE LnEAITY OF DISCOURSE
Reference here, of course, is being made to the fact that we
can only utter or write down words one at a time. To paraphrase
Quine, 9 we often find that an understanding of some matter A
is necessary preparation for an understanding of some matter B
which we are trying to explain. Yet, we sometimes find that A
itself cannot be explained in adequate detail or even correctly, in
ness precisely in order to give a large measure of freedom to the courts. Some-
times, however, a court which is impatient with legislative lethargy in initiat-
ing 'legal -reforms may seize upon intentionally vague language in a. statute
to bring about so-called "necessary" reforms on its own initiative. In such
situations it might be said that the legislature meant -to be vague but not
quite as vague as the court has made out. That technique of government
which employs the purposive use of vagueness might then 'be said to have
been abused. The court has exceeded the freedom which the legislature meant
it to -have. But the present Article is concerned with vagueness and legal lan-
guage. As already noted, therefore, the ambitious undertaking of how to deal
with the -problems of legislative control over judicial action that are sug-
gested in a discussion of vagueness and legal language is beyond the scope of
this Article. It might be noted in passing, however, that these problems are
often political in nature.
17. QuNE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 127.
18. RIcus, TnE Pmiosopry Or RmToinc 69-73 (1936); cf. OGDo.s &
RicHAns, Tan MmANIG OF MhAwmG 205-07 (8th ed. 1946). See also
Ricinns, op. cit. supra at 61-63.
19. QuiNE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 127.
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any sense of that word, without an awareness of certain excep-
tions and distinctions that depend on a prior understanding of
B. This, of course, is always the problem of one constructing a
dictionary and is very often the problem confronting one who
is drafting a statute. Moreover, in both endeavors variations of
the basic problem are often met: A is defined in terms of B; to
understand B one must know not only perhaps something about
A, but also something about C and D; and for some reason or
other it is not felt expedient to define C and D until a much later
stage in the drafting process. In all these situations vagueness
comes to the rescue of the draftsmen. One first states or uses A
vaguely, proceeds to B, C, and D, and eventually narrows down
the meaning of A without ever having to call upon the reader "to
learn and unlearn any outright falsehood"' 2 in the preliminary
statement of A. One need not turn to a dictionary for examples
or even dwell for long on the fact that dictionaries are sometimes
forced to be almost completely circular in definition, as when, for
example, "poetry" is defined, inter alia, as "the art or work of
poets" and a "poet" is defined as "a composer of poetry."2' The
law abounds with examples of the use and abuse of this technique
and a few examples should suffice to make the point sufficiently
clear.
In section 1 of the Restatement of Contracts a contract is
defined as a promise or set of promises for the "breach" of which
the law gives a remedy.22 The draftsmen were forced to begin
somewhere and accordingly they began with a definition of "con-
tract." And yet to define "contract" they had to use the concept
of breach or breach of contract, a concept which they had not yet
defined. The draftsmen presupposed that the term "breach" as
applied to contracts had already some vague meaning for the
reader, at least enough of a meaning to let them proceed on their
scheme for the construction of their restatement of the law. In-
deed, it is not until section 312, by which time the notion of con-
tract has been much refined, that they proceed to define "breach
of contract."23 There, under the topic heading "Nature of a
Breach," section 312 defines "a breach of contract" as the non-
performance of any "contractual" duty of immediate perform-
ance. Then, in the next 13 sections they proceed to particularize
more fully what they mean by "a breach of contract."
Now, it is not being urged that the draftsmen of the Restate-
20. Ibid.
21. WErsTE's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 651 (1951 ed.).
22. RESTATMENT, CONTRACTS 1 (193).
23. Id. § 312.
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ment are engaging in circular reasoning. There would seem to
be nothing improper in what they are doing. They were faced
with the problem of defining what a contract is when the notion
of a contract depends on some understanding of what it means
to breach a contract; and yet to fully understand what is meant
by a breach of contract one must know what is a contract and
what is a contractual duty. Here the fact that their readers al-
ready have a vague concept of "breach" comes to the draftsmen's
rescue and allows them to proceed step by step. Otherwise their
task would be almost hopeless.
A second- less clear cut and thus more typical - example
to illustrate the point is a problem dealt with by the draftsmen
of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1988, the pertinent provisions
of which have been incorporated into the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958. In section 1(2) of the 1938 act, an "air carrier" was de-
fined as any citizen of the United States who engages in "air
transportation." 4 It was assumed that the term "air transporta-
tion" already had-perhaps at least some vague meaning for the
reader. Then, in section 1(10), "air transportation" was defined
as "interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation."2 5 It was
here assumed that the words "interstate," "overseas," and "for-
eign" already -had some vague meaning for the reader which
further helped him in understanding the term "air transporta-
tion," for this term without any further intermediate definition
was then used in a succeeding. definition. Not until section 1(21)
was everything brought together, when the meaning of "inter-
state," "overseas," and "foreign," as applied to "air transporta-
tion," was explained2 6 In that section "interstate air transporta-
tion," "overseas air transportation," and "foreign air transporta-
tion" were respectively defined to mean the "carriage by aircraft
of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or
hire or the carriage of mail by aircraft, in commerce between"
certain points, the "interstate," "overseas," or "foreign" charac-
ter of the air transportation depending on the points between
which the carriage is performed.27 By this stage it is clear why an
"air carrier" is one who engages in "air transportation" and why
"air transportation" is something done by an "air carrier." It is
also now clear why a knowledge of what is "interstate, overseas,
or foreign air transportation" was considered a prerequisite for
knowing what "air transportation" is and why a crude definition
24. 52 Stat. 977 (1938) (now 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1958)).
25. 52 Stat. 978 (1938) (now 49 IJS.C. § 1301(10) (1958)).
26. 52 Stat. 979 (1938) (now 49 U.S.C. § 1301(21) (1958)).
27. Ibid.
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of "air transportation" as "interstate, overseas, or foreign air
transportation" is a helpful intermediate definition before at-
tempting to define these latter terms, upon whose definition a
complete understanding of "air transportation" depends.
If words carried no meaning to the reader apart from the mean-
ing conveyed by the actual definitions contained in the act, any
definition would of course have been impossible since no act can
define every word used therein. Even more important for present
purposes, reading an act would be like reading random and arbi-
trary collections of symbols which would have no meaning at all
until every word in the act had already been read. Only a com-
puter could have a good enough memory to be able to read a
document in this way.
The examples given should suffice to clear up the point now
being illustrated. The big danger to be noted in the use of this
definitional technique - the presupposition of some vague under-
standing of terms to be later more adequately defined partly in
terms of what has by then already been defined - is that one may
come close to finding himself engaged in the circular reasoning
which has infected some of the attempts to define "poet" and
"poetry."28 This would have been the case in the example taken
from the Restatement of Contracts if the draftsmen, rather than
postponing, as they did, further definition until the concept of "a
contract" had been adequately refined, had attempted to present
the definition of "a breach of contract" immediately after the
definition of "a contract." But draftsmen are neither always this
careful nor, perhaps, do they always care. At any rate, as the fol-
lowing provisions of the recent New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules would seem to suggest, the never, never land of circular
definition may not really always be so very far away.
Section 105. Definitions ....
(i) Judgment. The word "judgment" means a final or interlocutory
judgment.
(j) Judgment creditor. A "judgment creditor" is a person in whose
favor a money judgment is entered or a person who becomes entitled
to enforce it.
(k) Judgment debtor. A "judgment debtor" is -a person, other
than a defendant not summoned in the action, against whom a money
judgment is entered ....
(n) Money judgment. A "money judgment" is a judgment, or any
part thereof, for a sum of money or directing the payment of a sum
of money.29
28. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
29. N.Y. Civ. PR4c. L. & R. § 105 (1962).
[Vol. 48:885
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The situation is only saved from complete ludicrousness by the
fact that in section 5011, after the word judgment has already
been used hundreds of times in the act, a judgment is, finally,
defined again as "the determination of the rights of the parties in
an action or special proceeding and may be either interlocutory or
final! '30 The words "interlocutory" and "final," however, are
never defined, and why, if these terms are not thought sufficiently
important to define, it is helpful to know -that a money judgment
is, inter alia, a judgment for a sum of money, is not readily ap-
parent. Were it not for the fact that the draftsmen can safely
assume that most lawyers already quite thoroughly know the
meaning of the words being defined, it would appear that the
definitional techniques used would have been of little help in
furthering an understanding of the act.
B. VAGuENEss As AN AID TO PRECIsIoN
If men had sufficient technical terms of very precise meaning
to cover every complex idea that they wished to express, vague-
ness would perhaps not be so necessary as a means for achieving
precision in discourse. There is no such sufficient fund of precise
technical terms available, however, nor is it likely that there shall
ever be -such a complete pool of technical words. Moreover, wheth-
er the availability of a hypothetically fairly complete set of pre-
cise technical terms would be an advantage is at the very least
open to question. The expansion of the vocabulary would have to be
of enormous dimensions to accommodate the vast number of new
terms required, and it is evident that human life being what it is
there would always be some areas where precise technical terms
were not yet available. Who could hope to master such an immense
language? Who would dare to teach it? As a practical matter,
then, although precise terms do have their uses, there will be much
need of other devices to achieve workable precision in language.
One such device employs the use of vagueness. Reasonable
precision may be achieved through the use of several general
terms to narrow down the intended meaning to the area of over-
lap of the terms used, somewhat as precision in spatial reference
may be achieved through the overlapping of circles and the fo-
cusing of attention on the area which the several intersecting cir-
cles have in commonY' A novelist makes use of this device, for
example, to describe a sunset; a lawyer uses the same device to
define a vague general word which he proposes to use in a statute
So. N.Y. Civ. PFic. L. & R. § 5011 (1962). See generally 5 WEvzsa rw,
Kon.x & mx, NEw YoRK Civm PRACTICE 5011.01 (1963).
31. Of. RicHAns, op. cit. supra note 18, at 69-73.
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or a contract. Examples from legal sources must surely immedi-
ately occur to the most casual reader. It will thus only be neces-
sary to give a few simple examples of how the superimposition of
several vague general terms can be used by lawyers to arrive at
a workable precision.
The following definitions obtained from various random
sources are fairly adequate examples:
(1) From the Restatement of Torts:
An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of
serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter
of common usage.82
(2) From the Regulations of the Food and Drug Administration:
The term "coal-tar color" means articles which (1) are composed of
or contain any substance derived from coal tar, or 'any substance so
related in its chemical structure to a constituent of coal tar as to be
capable of derivation from such constituent; and 2) when added or
applied to a food, drug, cosmetic, or the human body or any part there-
of, are capable (alone or -through reaction with other substance) of
imparting color thereto.3s
(3) From the Criminal Code of the United States:
For the purposes of this section "labor organization" means any
organization of any kind, or any -agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exist for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work.84
Although the words in terms of which the expressions "ultra-
hazardous activity," "coal-tar color," and "labor organization"
are defined are not much more precise than the expressions being
defined, these definitions are very helpful in focusing attention
on what the respective draftsmen hoped to cover by the use of
the terms in question and in determining what was not intended
to be included in the meaning of these terms in the context in
which they are being used.
In the examples, vague terms were given a more readily ap-
prehendable content through the superimposition of vagueness.
As has been already noted, this use of vagueness permits us to
fulfill our needs for adequate means of communication without
encumbering our language with a vocabulary so enormous as to
32. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 520 (1938).
33. 21 C.F.R. § 9.1(a) (1963).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958).
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preclude practical utilization of language. Vagueness here has
been used to fill in the outline of terms of broad but imprecise
meaning. The definitions give content to the general offhand
reaction to these terms.
Sometimes vagueness helps us to cut down the size of the vo-
cabulary necessary for adequate communication in a somewhat
different way. We may, for example, for want of any other avail-
able word, wish to use a vague word in one of what might in
some situations be called its secondary meanings and to exclude
entirely the other and more usual meanings associated with this
word. We may then say that "for purposes of this statute X
shall mean ... or "shalt be defined as ... " Thus, we may
cope with a new situation by using a known word in one of its
less usual senses, without at the same time disputing that the
word in most other contexts has a somewhat different meaning.
Through the "defined as" device, an ad Ioc solution has been
reached without outraging anyone's sense of linguistic propriety.
The lawyer has thereby avoided having to invent a new word
and he has, as far as he could, avoided taking sides as to the
"proper" or "primary" or "most helpful" use of a word?5 He has
left these jobs for the professional linguists; vagueness has given
the lawyer the means of proceeding in the absence of such special
guidance and possibly even despite such special guidance?0
Perhaps as clear an illustration of this technique as one could
wish is the definition of "political activity" contained in the Regis-
tration Act of 1940:
For the purposes of this section: "Political activity" means any
activity the purpose or aim of which, or one of the purposes or aims of
which, is the control by force or overthrow of the Government of the
United States or a political subdivision thereof, or any State or political
subdivision thereof... 7
35. One might note in passing that some inquiries concerning meaning,
such as those seeking the "true" or "real" meaning of the expressions under
consideration, seem fruitless. See Hart, supra note 2, at 144; cf. Qumz, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 26-38, 160.
36. My attention was drawn to this aspect of legal language by the late
Professor Austin's discussion of "adjuster-words." AusTiN, S sE AND S.si-
BILL4. 73-77 (reconstructed -by G. Warnock 1962). Professor Austin, a philoso-
pher, not a lawyer, discusses the use of expressions "like a pig" to enable us,
without inventing new words, to talk of animals similar to pigs in some ways
but dissimilar in other ways. It seems to me the "defined as" technique in
the law serves the 6ame purpose of allowing us to proceed without having to
tamper with, or even to get involved in deciding on, the primary meaning
of the word being used. See . at 75.
37. 54 Stat. 1201, 18 UTS.C. § 2386 (1958).
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That this is not a usual definition of "political activity" is too
clear for further comment. Yet one would be loath to say that
"political activity" does not include the activities upon which this
act has focused attention.
III.
In the preceding sections of this Article, attention has been
drawn to the fact that vagueness can serve some very useful func-
tions in communication. There are nevertheless some serious limi-
tations on use of language as a means of ordering human relations
that are imposed by the inescapable element of vagueness. The
succeeding portions of this Article will discuss some of the prob-
lems created by the presence of these limitations.
A. THE APPLICATION OF VAGUELY WORDED STANDARDS - Dis-
TINCTIONS NOT CAPABLE OF ARTICULATION
That language is too imprecise to perform certain desirable
tasks is evident; the important question is what conclusions one
should draw from this defect in language. A number of courts, it
is submitted, have drawn the wrong conclusion. These courts
have been confronted with situations in which they could not
articulate the distinctions they wished to draw between the vari-
ous factual situations involved. From this inability they con-
cluded that the difference to which they wished to call attention
did not exist. Yet, differences do exist in the real world, differ-
ences of which thoughtful -and even sometimes unthoughtful
- people can be aware, and often no satisfactory articulation of
the differences can be made.3" Surely one would be foolhardy to
deny that a brandy taster can tell the differences among several
samples of cognac with which he has been presented, even though
the taster might not be able to explain what the differences are.
Indeed, we all do somewhat the same thing in testing colors, for
example. Most of us can distinguish between, say, turquoise and
aquamarine, even though an adequate verbal description of the
variance would be difficult. We should find the task of differentia-
tion and explanation easier, of course, if we could have both the
aquamarine and the turquoise samples before our eyes at the
same time so that we could answer questions by just pointing
at the samples. A similar approach is justified, and is indeed often
used, in the law. Cases are often decided on the basis of a com-
parison with other real and imaginary cases, even though a com-
pletely adequate test for imposing the reasoning of one group of
38. Cf. AUSTIN, Other Minds, in PHILosoPHIcAL PAPERs 44, 52-53 (1961).
Austin asserts that we know many things that we cannot deseribe in words.
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cases, rather than that of another group, on a particular fact
situation would be difficult to formulate.
Some courts have ignored these "facts." For example, the at-
tempts -to distinguish among slight negligence, negligence, gross
negligence, and recklessness (often equated with wanton negli-
gence) are familiar. Many of the attempts were prompted by the
provisions of automobile guest statutes that exempted the owner
and/or driver from liability for negligence but imposed liability
for either gross negligence or recklessness. The manner in which
these statutes were framed indicated that the legislature felt
that not only were gross negligence and recklessness distinguish-
able but that gross negligence could be distinguished from negli-
gence 9 Judge Magruder's description of Chief Justice Rugg's
method of distinguishing among negligence, gross negligence and
recklessness is instructive: It was simply the difference "among
a fool, a damned fool, and a God-damned fool."40 Although one
would intuitively argue that these distinctions make much sense,
the attempt to apply the distinctions in practice proved perplex-
ing. Eventually many courts threw up their hands and declared
that -there were no degrees of negligence, that there was no prac-
ticable difference among slight negligence, negligence, and gross
negligence. The only workable distinction was between negli-
gence and recklessness.4 The distinction between the two was
said to lie in the fact that negligence was to be determined solely
by objective standards, whereas recklessness required a type of
89. See Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Ore. 366, 390, 354 P.d 56, 67 (1960).
Compare Finkler v. Zinmer, .58 M ch. 336, 241 N.W. 851 (1932), with id. at
349,241 N.W. at 853 (concurring opinion).
40. Harvard Law Record, April 16, 1959, p. 7, quoted in Psossm & Srra,
CASEs oN ToRTs 213 (3d ed. 1962).
41. A good example is Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Ore. 366, 354 P.2d 56
('1960). The statute in question spoke in terms of "gross negligence or . . .
reckless disregard of the rights of others." The court -held fthat gross negligence
was to 'be construed as identical with "reckless disregard of the rights of oth-
ers," because the courts were unable to "separate" the two expressions. Id. at
S90-92, 354 o ad at 67-68:
It has been argued that our statute clearly expresses the legislative
intent Classify gross negligence as a type of conduct separate and
less culpable than reckless conduct. It is not impossible that the legis-
lative draftsman labored amder 'the misconception (not uncommon in
1929 when our guest statute was enacted) -that negligence could be
divided into degrees. If 'we should assume that the legislature intended
to describe a degree of fault which -the courts are unable to separate
from reckless conduct, then the statute would have to be declared void
for vagueness. The other choice is to reconcile the two expressions in
the statute.
Similar cases in other states are cited in the opinion. Some of these cases are
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mens rea.42 It was this mens rea which was said to distinguish
recklessness from negligence and not any necessary differences in
the objective manifestations of the behavior being examined.
Yet, in proving recklessness, it was recognized that it was not
necessary to show that the defendant intended to do the harm
which he caused or even that he actually appreciated the great
risk to which he was subjecting others. It was enough if he should
have appreciated the high degree of risk involved. 43 The result,
therefore, was not exactly the abolition of degrees of negligence.
The hypothetical reasonable man entered the picture again, not,
of course, to determine what the reasonable man would have
done under the circumstances but rather to determine what the
reasonable man's state of mind would have been had he done the
things which the defendant was accused of doing. Degrees of
negligence were reintroduced under the guise of something akin
to implied malice, i.e. implied recklessness. The primary result,
then, was merely that one possible further distinction was dis-
carded without perhaps adequate examination of the utility of
retaining this distinction.
It is the thesis of this Article that differences which are hard to
articulate can still be utilized in the law. To remain with the exam-
ple now being discussed, it is submitted that slight negligence, negli-
gence, gross negligence, and recklessness may be distinguished
among themselves and that perhaps even other further distinc-
tions of a similar nature might be made. It is further contended
that not only can these distinctions be made, but that courts (or
courts and juries) can make these distinctions. It is, however, not
being argued that appellate courts can tell the lower courts spe-
cifically how to make these distinctions or that juries can be
among the cases cited in notes 42 and 43 infra. For a discussion of the very
unsatisfactory treatment courts have accorded to the language in uutomobile
guest statutes, see HARPER & J.&mss, THE LAW OF TORTS 950-54 (1956).
In a very recent case, Clayton v. Bartoszewski, 198 A.2d 692 (Del. 1964),
the Delaware Court, in applying a Virginia statute, noted that Virginia did
distinguish between gross negligence and recklessness and concluded that Vir-
ginia took the pragmatic approach of defining gross negligence as conduct on
the part of the driver of a motor vehicle such as will allow a nonpaying guest
to recover in the absence of a showing of contributory negligence. A claim
based on recklessness could not be so defeated. To the present writer, this is
a refreshing point of view.
42. See, e.g., Brown v. Roach, 67 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1953); Findlay v.
Davis, 263 Mich. 179, 248 N.W. 588 (1933); Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Ore.
366, 389-90, 354 P.2d 56, 67 (1960).
43. See, e.g., Olszewski v. Dibrizio, 281 Mich. 423, 424, 275 N.W. 194, 195
(1937); Williamson v. Mc.Kenna, 223 Ore. 366, 390-400, 354 P.2d 56, 67-71
(1960). The Restatement of Torts defines "reckless disregard of safety" as an
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specifically told how to make these distinctions. If it is neces-
sary for appellate courts, in reviewing lower court decisions, not
only to supervise generally the lower courts' results but also to
tell the lower courts exactly how to proceed, then the task of dis-
tinguishing in great detail is indeed hopeless. Moreover, many
distinctions, even some which the courts presently make, should
then be abandoned.
It is the position of this Article that appellate courts need not
always tell lower courts and juries exactly how to proceed. Ade-
quate supervision and meaningful appellate review can often be
secured without any such ambitious goal. Indeed, as previously
noted, there are areas where it is specifically recognized that juries
and lower courts can handle distinctions despite the fact that
an appellate court would be hard put to articulate adequately
any type of test usable by anyone who was not already aware of
the distinction in question. The appellate courts, for instance,
have repeatedly rejected the argument that distinctions between
the amount of proof required in civil and criminal cases should
be dropped as well as the argument that there cannot be more
than one degree of proof required in civil cases. 4 The law is much
too flexible for that. The courts have asserted that juries can in-
deed distinguish between proof which satisfies the "preponder-
ance" test from that which also satisfies the "clear and convinc-
ing" test and that both these tests can in turn be distinguished
from the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test. It has been asserted
that these distinctions can be applied although any attempt to
describe the differences in even remotely logically foolproof terms
is doomed to utter failure. In fact it is generally agreed by many
courts and by most commentators that these terms, of whose
meaning jurors already have some notion, are best left undefined
because almost all attempted definitions create more problems
than they solve. 0 The most practical method of applying these
terms and of making the distinctions implicit in them is by the
putting of cases. The better jurors probably decide whether the
proof in the case before them satisfies the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" test or the "clear and convincing" test by asking them-
intentional act or omission done by one "kmowing or having reason to know"
that his conduct involves both an unreasonable risk of harm -to another and
a -high degree of probability that substantial harm will result. RrsTTE[rENT,
TORTS § 500 (1934). {Emphasis added.)
44. See, e.g., Kempf v. HImsel, 121 Ind. App. 488, 516, 98 N.E.2d 200,
212 (1951); Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ. 82, 91, 138 A2d 713, 717 (1958).
45. Ibd.
46. See McCoRiDn, EvImNcE 682-83 (1954); 9 WIGmoan, EvIDEcC
319-27 (3d ed. 1940).
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selves what, in the type of situation presented to them, would
unquestionably be an instance of proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt" or of "clear and convincing" evidence on a disputed point
and by then comparing the proof before them with the paradigm
cases.
It is not the thesis of this Article, however, that the current
standards of proof are the most aptly phrased or that juries ade-
quately handle those standards. 4 7 There is no need to take sides
here on these issues. Part of whatever problem is felt to exist no
doubt is partly owing to the fact that juries, unlike a judge acting
as the trier of fact, must decide in isolation how to apply the
pertinent standard of proof to the case before them without the
benefit of the experience of other juries in similar situations.48
Be that as it may, the important point here is that in certain cur-
rent situations, distinctions are recognized in the law even though
the distinctions cannot, in any very helpful sense, be adequately
articulated. The specific illustrative situations to which reference
has been made in the text of this Article are, moreover, not the
only ones.49 The second point being suggested here is that the
rational way to deal with such areas of the law is by the putting
of cases, real and imaginary, with which the instant case can be
47. In Comment, Evidence: The Validity of Mdtiple Standards of Proof,
1959 Wis. L. REv. 525, an attempt is made on the basis of a controlled expori-
ment to show that -the standards are neither aptly phrased nor adequately
handled by juries. But, from the way the standards of proof used in the ex-
periment were formulated and the limited scope of the experiment, I fail to
see dthat the arguments were substantiated. Preponderant proof, for example,
was proof which made the fact in question "more likely than not," while
clear and convincing proof imposed a burden greater than one which required
"that the facts are more probably true ,than false." Id. at 528-29. Moreover,
the fact that one person might believe that something was highly probable
while on the same evidence another might believe that the fact was not even
more probable is not only not surprising but should have been taken into
account. Juries sit in groups of 12 for this reason, because on an individual
basis degrees of probability are very largely subjective. For the interesting sug-
gestion that the emphasis should be on degrees of belief of the jurors rather
than the weight of the evidence, see MeBaine, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, 32 CAroxF. L. REv. 249 .(1944).
48. It might be of some relevance to note in this connection that Judge
Palmore of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky -has criticized the practice in
that state of allowing juries to fix sentences in criminal cases, inter alia, on
the ground that a jury faced with such a task must act without knowing what
other juries have done in similar cases. PALmoRE, SENTENCINg OF CRIMINALS
iNr KENTUCKY (Kentucky Review of Government No. 6, 1963).
49. As will be made explicitly clear later on, in the text following note 61
infra, the problem of how to distinguish among different standards of proof
or different degrees of negligence is nothing but a limiting case of the more
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compared.50 To illustrate what is meant by such a case-by-ease
approach in areas where precise definition is impossible, an at-
tempt will be made to indicate how various degrees of negligence
could be distinguished in, say, automobile cases as required by a
hypothetical statute that imposes a graduated scale of recovery
for various shades of asocial conduct, depending on the degree of
culpability involved. The degrees of culpability in ascending order
will be called slight negligence, negligence, gross negligence, and
recklessness.
Assume that the first case presented to a trial court involves
an automobile driven at 60 miles per hour through a built-up area
where the speed limit is 30 miles per hour. Let us assume - al-
though it is not essential to do so - that, since by hypothesis this
is the very first case of this type, the jury finds the facts in a spe-
cial verdict and the court decides whether, on the facts as found,
the defendant is liable. Let us assume further that the judge rules
against the defendant on the grounds that he has been negligent,
that he has not behaved as a reasonable man would have in like
circumstances. It is apparent, of course, that the only thing that
is important here is that a decision be made. What decision is
made is for present purposes relatively unimportant. Assume now
a second case in which a person driving through a similar built-up
area at 35 miles per hour is found to have been guilty of slight
negligence. Then, assume a third case where one driving through
such an area at 75 miles per hour is found to have been guilty of
gross negligence. Finally, assume a case where a man is found to
have acted recklessly by driving through a built-up area with a
common general problem of how to apply any general standard which does not
supply a precise test for deciding what is 'within and what is without the
standard. Ieaving aside the obvious reference -to the question as to what a
reasonable man would have done, which is asked in negligence cases, one may
refer to judicial willingness to decide what, in Chief Justice White's phrase,
is an "unreasonable" restraint of trade, Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 60 (1912), or to English concern as to what is "natural justice" in
exercising review of administrative orders, see note 50 infra.
50.
In modern times opinions have sometimes -been expressed to the
effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless.
But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that be-
cause something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or meas-
ured therefore it does not exist. The idea of negligence is equally insus-
ceptible of exact definition -but what a reasonable man would regard
as fair procedure in particular circumstances and what he would regard
as negligence in particular circumstances are equally capable of serving
as tests in law, and natural justice as it had been interpreted in the
courts is much more definite than that.
Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, 71 .(HL.) (Lord Reid).
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30-mile speed limit at 90 miles per hour. There will be other cases
too, cases where the defendant motorist has been drinking and/or
trying to caress his girl friend. Here again the most important
thing is that decisions be made. Exactly what decision is made
in a particular case is not, for present purposes, very important.
Now, when a new case is presented to the courts, the question is
how like the past cases is the instant case. Is a case where the
defendant was driving 55 miles per hour through a built-up area
more like the case of slight negligence where the defendant was
doing 35 miles per hour or is it more like the case of negligence
where the defendant was doing 60 miles per hour? It will be noted
that an attempt is not being made to classify the 55 miles per
hour case with the 60 miles per hour case and then to explain
why both are examples of negligence rather than of slight negli-
gence or of gross negligence or of recklessness. If this is the task
of the court faced with the 55 miles per hour case, then all the
old problems reappear and the task may well be hopeless." The
problem is, given that 60 miles per hour is negligence and that
35 miles per hour is slight negligence, what should 55 miles per
hour be classed as? It is evident that one would be foolish and
just plain wrong to say that reason has no place in such a scheme.
As noted, of course, these are not instances of situations where
reason comes in to prescribe a grand test to justify and explain
all the cases. Rather, given certain cases decided in a certain
way, we ask, can the instant case be meaningfully distinguished
in a rational way from any of the decided cases? If not, if the
instant case is like an earlier case except for the fact that the
plaintiff has red hair, then the instant case must be decided as
the prior one was. In the example given earlier, if the two prece-
dents in point are 35 miles per hour is slight negligence and 60
miles per hour is negligence, then a case involving a car driven at
55 miles per hour, it must be conceded, should result in a finding
of negligence. In summing up, to appropriate, if I may, the more
eloquent prose used by Roy Stone in another and more general
context, given that the former is negligence then the question is:
"how like a spark from a traveling steam engine which ignites a
51. I am assuming, of course, that once it has been decided either legis-
latively or even judicially to use multiple standards the courts are not about
to allow the constant relitigation of the wisdom of such use. I am also assum-
ing that something like a system of stare decisis prevails, so that precedents
can serve as paradigm cases because precedents, particularly the leading
precedents which furnish the key paradigm cases, are not lightly overruled.
These assumptions, of course, are the assumptions underlying our present
legal system.
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nearby hay-rick are the decomposed remains of a snail in a ginger
beer bottle which causes harm to the plaintiff -is a cricket ball
hit out of the ground injuring a woman on the highway...."-'
It may be objected that this technique is not suitable for use
by juries but rather is practicable only in a country like England
where most civil suits are tried to a judge without a juryP5 This
would not necessarily seem to be so. First, the jury already has
a rough idea of what terms like slight negligence, gross negligence,
and recklessness mean. Second, if a higher degree of consistency
is desired, the judge could charge the jury in general terms so as
to make sure that all the jurors have a rough idea of the relevant
distinctions and then give the jury a few examples of what, in
somewhat related circumstances, have been held to be reckless-
ness, gross negligence, negligence, etc 4 Admittedly, although in
the federal courts and in many state courts judges are permitted
both to sum up the evidence for the jury and to comment upon
the evidence, they do not in fact generally do so.P5 Such reticence
is presumably based on the fear that an inadvertent word might
lead to a reversal on the ground that the court was invading the
province of the jury and indicating how the case should be de-
cided. Thus, even though they might, American trial courts usu-
ally do not use examples to clarify the words used in their charges.
Still, in many American jurisdictions judges can and sometimes
perhaps-do illustrate their instructions to the jury by posing ilus-
trative cases&6 Moreover, with respect to degrees of negligence,
something like this on a less ambitious scale is already being done
in comparative negligence jurisdictions like Nebraska and Wis-
52. Stone, Symposium and Suit, Northwest Review, VoL 5, No. 4, p. 10,
at 13 (1962).
53. Although the point really needs no citation, reference may be made
to the leading work on the subject, JACKSON, THE MACHnEY Or JusicE w
ENGLANID 63-65 .(2d ed. 1953).
54. COf. Lord Atkin's suggestions for explaining to a jury the difference
between the crime of dangerous driving and the crime of manslaughter
through the operation of a motor vehicle. Andrews v. Director of Pub. Prose-
cutions, [1937] A.C. 576, 584-85.
55. See Wright. Thstructions to the Jury: Summary Without Comment,
5 WASH. U.L.Q. 177-79, 212 (1954); Wright, Adequacy of Instruction to the
Jury: I, 53 Mc. L. lInv. 505, 507 (1955). For a survey of the current status
of the power of judges to comment on the evidence in instructing the jury,
see ITim-ois SurMM COURT Coxmm-rsM oN Juar IN sRUCTIONS § 00.01
(Sept. 1959 draft). See also Wright The Invasion of Jury: Temperature of
the War, 27 TMm. L.Q. 137 (1953).
56. For the power of the federal courts, see Quercia v. United States, 289
U.S. 466 (1933). For -the situation with respect to the states, see Wright,
Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury: 1, 53 Mica. L. Ruv. 505, 507 n.10 (1955).
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consin. In Nebraska plaintiff may recover only if his negligence
is "slight" in relation to defendant's, and the jury, with what
guidance it can get from the judge, must, in the light of their own
experience and of their powers of reason and of imagination, com-
pare the defendant's negligence with that of the plaintiff. 7 In
Wisconsin plaintiff may recover only if his negligence "is not as
great" as that of the defendant.5 8
It might also be noted that most of the so-called reform move-
ments have favored greater judicial participation in the trial of
jury cases."9 Finally, many difficult types of civil cases such as
antitrust cases, both civil and criminal, are being increasingly
tried by the court without a jury, precisely, it would seem, be-
cause a judge can and, of course, does look at the other cases in
pointY0 Thus it is not totally unrealistic to suppose that with the
help of illustrative examples a judge or a judge and a jury can
handle many distinctions which could profitably be utilized and
with which they could not otherwise deal. Even without the pos-
A recently decided case, United States v. Merz, 84 Sup. Ct. 639 (1004),
deserves mention in regard to what could be done in this area. The case con-
cerned judicial use of commissions to determine the issue of "just compensa-
tion" in eminent domain proceedings. The Court, through Mr. Justice Douglas,
noted that the commissioners, "we assume, will normally be laymen, inex-
perienced in the law". Id. at 643. The Court declared:
The judge who uses commissioners, however, establishes a tribunal that
may become free-wheeling, taking the law from itself, unless subject
to close supervision. The first responsibility of the District Court, apart
from the selection of responsible commissioners, is careful instruction
of them on the law. That was done in one of the present cases. But
the instructions should explain with some particularity the qualifica-
tions of expert witnesses, the weight to 'be given other opinion evidence,
competent evidence of value, the best evidence of value, illustrative
examples of severance damages, and the like.
Ibid.
57. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 25-1151 (1956). See also S.D. CODE § 47.0304-1
(Supp. 1960).
58. Wis. STAT. § S31.045 (1961).
59. See A.B.A. R P., SECTION oF JuDiciAL ADMINISTmATION (1938); VAN-
DERBILT, MIN]MVM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 221-62 (1949).
The Report of the Section of Judicial Administration was 'adopted by the ABA
at its convention in July 1938 except for the recommendation for universal
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 221-22, 505 n.*.
60. Reference to table C 4 of the appendixes of each of the Annual Re-
ports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
for the period 1957-62 (1961 excepted) indicates that of cases between private
individuals and involving -federal questions more than twice as many are
tried to the court without a jury than with a jury. Almost all contract actions
in which the United States is plaintiff are tried without a jury. The 1961
Report is unusable because for some inexplicable reason table C 4 therein is
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ing of illustrative examples by the trial courts, the law can and
does rely on standards which cannot be adequately explained in
words. As already noted, jurors generally have a fairly good idea
of the meaning of terms like slight negligence and gross negligence
or reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidencelo and
they already have in mind some paradigm cases illustrating the
use of these terms. Nor, as will be shown shortly, even in cases
of this type is it impossible -to achieve an adequate degree of con-
sistency among jury verdicts. Without the use of illustrative ex-
amples, however, the number of such vague standards whichjuries can adequately handle is, of course, limited. In the growing
area of civil cases tried without a jury, as previously noted, these
limitations, of course, do not exist.
It will be appreciated that the problem which has just been
discussed is really but a special case of a more general legal phe-
nomenon. The chief problem considered thus far has been how
to differentiate in application among standards incapable of pre-
cise definition. It has been a difficult problem because the stand-
ards involved have applied to the same general type of factual
situation and it has been found impossible adequately to express
in words the differences upon which choice of the applicable stand-
ard depends. The more general problem, to which some allusion
has already been made, is how to apply any standard expressed
in vague general terms. Here the problem is not, if you will, a
choice between competing standards but between the application
or nonapplication of one particular standard. The obvious point
is, however, that the problems merge. In the more general case
no one could seriously argue that, short of abandonment, there
is any alternative to a case-by-case particularization of what a
vague general standard means. Nor, unless one is willing to urge
the abolition of the jury, can one maintain that, even with proper
judicial guidance, juries are incapable of participating in such a
case-by-case development. That juries usually have some vague
compiled differently from those of other years. In -the 1962 Report, table D 4
"shows that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, of 19 defendants in
criminal antitrust suits who were actually tried, 15 were tried to a judge
without a jury. Cf. Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11
LoYoL& L. R v. 243, 249-52 ,(1963). Most studies of the jury system in civil
cases focus, of course, on personal injury litigation. See JonsEm, CIvI JusTicE
A Juny (1962); LnviN & WooIi=, DisPAT C AirD DEry (1961). Refer-
ence has already been made to Judge Palmore's dissatisfaction with the Ken-
tucky system of permitting juries to sentence offenders because the juries are
ignorant of what other juries have done in similar cases. Note 48 supra.
61. See notes 46, 56 & 58 spra.
62. See note 60 supra.
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idea of what most general legal standards encompass is of con-
siderable help. If judges could and would aid them further with
the use of paradigm cases, the job could be accomplished more
satisfactorily. The handling of multiple standards is admittedly
more difficult, and that is why I have concentrated on it in this
Article. Although it is more difficult, I do not believe it cannot be
done and I hope I have shown how it can be done and is being
done.
B. JUDIcIAL - PARTICULARLY APPELLATE COURT - SUPERVISION
A present day illustration of the problem of appellate court
supervision may be found in the Supreme Court's policy of grant-
ing certiorari in FELA and Jones Act cases."8 Conceding that the
criticism of this policy may be justified, once the Court has de-
cided to hear cases of this type for review of essentially factual
issues, it has no alternative but to accept a great many similar
cases so as to provide, through these decisions, a basis for ana-
logical reasoning from case to case by the lower courts."4 When
the phrase "no alternative" was used in the preceding sentence it
was assumed, of course, that, in addition to deciding the case be-
fore it, the Supreme Court desired to provide guidance to the
lower federal courts, even if only eventually to cut down the num-
ber of petitions for certiorari. It was further assumed that the
Court is not about to furnish the necessary guidance by promul-
gating the rule that "plaintiff always wins." ' Given, then, the
Supreme Court's desire to provide guidance in this area and given
63. See Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 96-98
(1959); Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising Under the
FELA, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1441 (1956); Comment, 6 VL. L. REv. 549 (1901).
See also Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 25 (1959) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 524 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan continued to make the same point in
Basharn v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S. 699, 701 (1963) (dissenting opinion)
and Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 122-23 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
64. Hart, supra note 63, at 96-98 argues that the Court is taking too
many of these cases. See also Note, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1441 (1956); Comment,
43 CoiRrNLL L.Q. 451 (1958). Basham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S. 099, 701
(1963), is the vehicle for Mr. Justice Harlan's latest emphasis on this point.
65. In Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1963) Mr. Justice
Goldberg, in a dissent in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr.
Justice Stewart, intimates that the Court may in fact -be making a workmen's
compensation statute out of the FELA. In Harris v. Pennsylvania R.t., 361
U.S. 15, 27-28 (1959) (dissenting opinion) and Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers,
Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1960) (dissenting opinion) MT. Justice Harlan indi-
cated that he feared that in this area the Court had abandoned all attempts to
control juries and that the Court was in effect appearing to promulgate a rule
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that the "plaintiff always wins" rule is unacceptable, it is no criti-
cism of the Court to argue that it is not furnishing sufficient gen-
eral guidance in the form of clear and readily applicable general
rules as to how to decide future controversies. In the nature of
things, such general rules clearly articulating all relevant con-
siderations are impossible. General rules are, of course, helpful
even here; but the only way an appellate court can assert close
control in this area is, in addition to formulating some general
rules, to proceed case by case to the establishment of what, on
certain facts, is negligence, is enough to get plaintiff to the jury.
With these examples before them, lower courts can then devote
themselves to seeing how the cases before them differ from those
"given" cases, the paradigm cases decided by the Supreme Court.
Only, of course, as the number of authoritatively determined
paradigm cases becomes sufficiently large will the guidance thus
furnished be more than fairly rough. Yet, the only way to estab-
lish any adequate guidance in this area is by such a case-by-case
method.
If a further reference to a use of this method may be permitted,
one might refer to the myriads of cases on "doing business" as a
test of venue and jurisdiction. General guidelines are provided by
the Supreme Court,67 but if one wants really to know what it is
to "do business," or how the "doing business" test differs from
the "transacting business" test, he would be well advised to ex-
amine the voluminous decisions turning on narrow factual distinc-
tions being issued every day by the federal and state courts 8 He
then may try to distinguish his case from or analogize his case to
the decided cases in his jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court wishes
to do more than give general guidance, then, as in the TELA and
Jones Act areas, it will have to handle a much larger load of
cases turning on factual differences not always of the greatest
magnitude.
The conclusion, then, is that courts can, do, and must handle
differences which cannot be articulated in precise general rules
by appellate courts. But to say this is not to say that results are
that whatever ;a jury says goes. See also Basham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 372 U.S.
699, 701 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 US. 15, 28 (1959) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Baker v. Texas & Pa c Ry., 359 U.S. 227, 229 (1959) (Frankfur-
ter, 3., dissenting).
67. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
68. For some idea of the immense number of cases in this area and of the
need for close factual analysis, see Note, Doing Buziness as a Test of Venue
and Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courty, 56 CoLum.
L. REv. 394 (1956).
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unpredictable or not subject to adequate appellate supervision.
Adequate appellate supervision may be achieved by broad and
perhaps fairly vague general formulas giving a general guidance
and by a selective acceptance for decision of cases involving clear
cut paradigm factual situations, while the trial courts - and in-
termediate appellate courts, perhaps through per curiam disposi-
tion without opinion- develop the large number of precedents
necessary to make the system work. If a looser degree of control
and less consistency among results is acceptable, the cases could
be left almost exclusively to the discretion of juries with the
courts confining their interference solely to those few cases, to
return to the original example, where no "reasonable jury" could
have found the conduct in question to be slight negligence, or
gross negligence, or negligence. A lesser number of paradigm cases
would be necessary here than in the situation where the courts
take a more active role in the trying of the cases. 9
At any rate, although the job cannot be done overnight, as
high a degree of predictability can be achieved in areas where
precise general rules are unavailable as in those areas where rela-
tively precise general rules differentiating various classes of facts
are possible. All that is necessary is that the area chosen for case-
by-case development be one where a large number of cases will
arise which require judicial resolution. As has already been sug-
gested, the job can even be accomplished by a relatively aloof
appellate tribunal, such as the Supreme Court, if it is willing to
pay the price of accepting a large number of cases. The impor-
tant point which must be stressed, however, is that appellate
courts must resist the temptation to conclude that, because no
precise general rules of differentiation are possible, the differ-
ences either do not exist or are such as to be unusable in a mature
legal system. Such a conclusion would rob the law of much of
its richness and impair its ability satisfactorily to order human
relations. To so conclude would also lead to an unwelcome incre-
ment in the already heavy concentration on the appellate courts
as the centers of the legal universe that dominates so much of
law teaching. Vagueness does incapacitate language from perform-
ing certain tasks by certain methods but there are other means
available for accomplishing many of these tasks. The putting of
cases, decision from examples, is one such means.
69. One might add that even the most precise general rule possible is no
insurance of consistency of application because of the necessity of finding that
the facts are such as to call into play the legal rule. The more precise the
rule the easier it is sometimes for the unscrupulous to avoid it. See FUANK,
Couars oN T mLa 52-53 (1949).
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CONCLUSION
Vagueness is an inescapable aspect of our language. It has been
submitted in this Article that vagueness is not always a hindrance
to precise and effective communication. Indeed an attempt has
been made to show that vagueness is sometimes an indispensable
tool for the achievement of accuracy and precision in language,
particularly in legal language. Vagueness in legal language has
also given our law a much needed flexibility. At the same time
there are some jobs which our linguistic tools, partly even because
of vagueness, cannot completely perform without the aid of other
communication devices. The error to be avoided here, it has been
submitted, is that of assuming that because general rules cannot
do it alone the job cannot be done, or is not worth doing. That
would be an error of the first magnitude.

